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Abstract 
We estimate the causal effects of armed conflict on years of education in the 
context of a school-going age cohort in Cote d’Ivoire. Using year and 
department of birth to identify an individual’s exposure to war, the difference-
in-difference outcomes indicate that the average years of education for a 
school-going age cohort is .94 years fewer compared to an older cohort in war-
affected regions. We further use a set of victimization indicators to identify the 
effect of war. Overall, the findings across different models suggest a drop in 
average years of education by a range of .2 to .9 fewer years.   
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I. Introduction 
Conflict affects education in several ways. It destroys infrastructure (Abdi, 1998), displaces and 
most tragically results in the deaths of students and teachers (Buckland, 2005), causes problems 
in harmonizing school calendars across war-affected regions (UNICEF, 2005) while schools 
remain closed for an indefinite period of time (Bruck, 1997), and has a damaging and pernicious 
socio-psychological impact on students (Sany, 2010). A cross-country analysis by Lai and Thyne 
(2007) shows that countries experiencing civil war suffer a decline in school enrolment by 1.6 to 
3.2 percentage points. Evidence is growing at the subnational level that the outcomes are similar. 
Merrouche (2006) documents that an exposure to landmines in Cambodia resulted in an average 
loss of .4 years of education. In a similar study, the mid-1990s genocide in Rwanda lowered the 
average level of educational attainment by .5 years (Akresh and de Walque, 2008). From the 
perspective of gender, Shemyakina (2006) finds that conflict makes no significant impact on 
male education rates in Tajikistan. However, females were 12.3 percentage points less likely to 
complete the mandatory secondary schooling compared to those who completed their education 
before the war broke out. A recent study, using household survey data between 2000 and 2008 
from twenty-five conflict affected countries, finds that conflict leaves a legacy of fewer average 
years of education, decreased literacy rates and a smaller share of the population with formal 
schooling (UNESCO, 2010).  
In this paper we estimate the average causal effect of conflict on education in Cote 
d’Ivoire. In particular, we measure the effect of Ivoirian conflict, which reached its peak between 
2002 and 2004, on years of education for individuals who were exposed to it in their school-
going age. The civil war in Cote d’Ivoire broke out in September 2002 as a result of growing 
ethnic tensions and a failed attempted military coup. It divided the country into two: the rebel-
held North and the government-controlled South and caused more than 3,000 deaths (World 
Bank, 2010). The war internally displaced more than 700,000 people and as many as 500,000 
children were out of school between 2002 and 2004 (UNICEF, 2004). According to the Ministry 
of Education in Cote d’Ivoire (2004), education in the North was affected more severely than 
education in the South. As per this report, almost 50 percent of the school-going aged children 
were out of school and only 20 percent of government-paid teachers stayed in their posts in the 
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North since 2002. Moreover, the start of the 2005 school year was delayed in the North, and 
approximately 72,000 children were unable to write their examinations in the North (UNICEF, 
2005).   
A recent study by UNESCO (2010) uses 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 
to conduct a quantitative study on the relationship between education and war in Cote d’Ivoire. 
This study finds an increase in the uneducated proportion of male cohorts in war-affected areas. 
Looking separately at the educational attainments for males and females, it concludes that for 
both genders the average educational attainment has dropped since the conflict broke out. To our 
knowledge this is the only quantitative study so far that examined the impact of war on education 
in Cote d’Ivoire. However, this study does not draw any causal inference on the potential impact 
of war on education. In addition, the MICS survey was undertaken in 2006 just after conflict had 
reached its peak, and as a result it might not have demonstrated the full impact of war.   
Our study aims to bridge this knowledge gap. We calculate the average causal effect of 
civil war on education in Cote d’Ivoire using the Households Living Standards Survey (HLSS) 
data collected in 2008 and the data on local incidences of conflict is taken from the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED). Our baseline empirical strategy to identify the 
indirect effect of war on education for the school-going age-cohort uses year and department of 
birth to determine an individual’s exposure to war. Using the variation in conflict intensity across 
departments, this strategy identifies the effect of conflict victimization indirectly. We also use a 
set of victimization indicators to measure the direct effect of war. The difference-in-difference 
regression outcomes indicate that the average years of education for individuals aged 10 to 22 
is .94 years fewer compared to the individuals aged 23 to 32 in war-affected regions.  
As a robustness check, we use the same set of victimization indicators to measure the 
potential effect of war and estimate a counterfactual comparison group based on propensity 
scores matching. This, we expect, is likely to minimize the selection bias and confounding in the 
causal effect. The average causal effect of war identified by all the victimization categories 
indicates .2 to .9 fewer average years of education for war victims compared to the matched 
control group. The outcomes of double-robust models satisfactorily show less chances of 
misspecification in the estimated models. The outcomes are robust when we use a number of 
sensitivity analyses including alternative matching methods, estimating the North and the South 
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subsamples separately. In addition, we estimate the direct effect of conflict exposure across 
gender and age-specific groups. The outcomes are robust and show the largest impact on boys 
and individual in the age group 19 to 22.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section II, we provide a brief outline of the nexus 
between education, politics and war in Cote d’Ivoire. Section III describes the data and provides 
some descriptive evidence. We discuss the empirical models, identification strategies and the 
empirical findings in section 4. This is followed by the outcomes of sensitivity analysis in section 
5. We provide our concluding remarks at the end.    
 
II. The Political Economy of War and Education 
To evaluate the impact of conflict on education in Cote d’Ivoire, it is important to understand the 
Ivoirian education system and how it was linked to the consequences of armed conflict. First we 
provide a brief account of the war and education nexus in Cote d’Ivoire for the period until the 
war broke out. We then discuss it for the period 2002 to 2006, during and after the conflict peak.   
2.1 The period until 2002 
Since its independence in 1960, the education system has been central to Ivoirian identity and 
politics. Cote d’Ivoire follows the centralized French education system, where the government 
plays a key role in curriculum development, coordination and allocation of resources and the 
organization of national examinations through the ministries of Education, Vocational Education 
and Higher Education. Prior to the civil war the education system was already struggling with a 
student-teacher ratio close to 40 (UNAIDS, 1998) while the net enrollment rate in primary 
education recorded around 60 percent (Cote d’Ivoire Ministry of Education, 2003). In 2000, 
following the Education for All (EFA) initiative - a worldwide plan to meet the learning 
outcomes of all children, youth, and adults by 2015 - a number of educational reforms were 
initiated by the newly elected President Laurent Gbagbo. The proposed agenda addressed areas 
that needed much attention including improvement of the status of teachers, enactment of the 
free public schooling through tenth grade and a nationwide preschool system. Perhaps because of 
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this the net national enrollment rate in primary education slightly improved to 64.2 percent in 
2001 (Cote d’Ivoire Ministry of Education, 2003).   
While economic disparity between the North and the South and polarization of ethnicity 
and identity based on national origin were arguably the main causes of Ivoirian civil war, 
unequal access to education and uneven allocation of educational infrastructures between the 
North and the South also played a crucial role (Sany, 2010). Despite the improvement in 
country-wide net enrollment rates in the early 2000s, the enrollment rate in the Northern states of 
Korhogo and Odiene were below 40 percent. Overall, there was a marked disparity in enrollment 
rates between the Northern states (less than or equal to 50 percent) and the Southern states (close 
to 80 percent).  
 
2.2 The period from 2002 to 2004 
The first phase of armed conflict started in September, 2002 but lasted for only a few months. 
The national army (FANCI) was joined by the Young Patriots, a youth militia that supported 
then President Gbagbo. On the other side, the rebel groups - the Movement for Justice and Peace 
(MJP), the Movement of the Ivory Coast of the Great West (MPIGO) and supporters of Alessane 
Outarra (current President) - joined forces under the banner of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) led by 
Guillame Soro. The momentum of educational reform initiated in 2000 was soon arrested by the 
outbreak of civil war. As the conflict broke out, education moved to the bottom of the national 
priority list (Sany, 2010). A UNICEF estimation in 2005 accounted for as many as 700,000 
children being out of school between 2002 and 2004. This figure included students from primary 
school to university level. In November 2004, riots against the French force in Abidjan destroyed 
infrastructure including numerous schools buildings there (UNICEF, 2005). In 2004, the Cote 
d’Ivoire Ministry of Education documented more than 50 percent of the students in the North did 
not have any access to school.   
As argued by Sany (2010) education was used by both parties as a tactic of war. Due to 
war the organizational and institutional challenges in delivering the basic educational facilities 
were less in the government-held South compared to the rebel held-North. The Government side 
used this as a strategy to portray the inability of non-governmental forces in providing basic 
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education and necessary infrastructure. Perhaps it paved a way for the government to legitimize 
its position, but it forced the non-governmental opposition to come up with an alternative 
strategy. An UNOCHA (2004) report found that there were more than 300,000 children in the 
North attending NGO-run primary and secondary schools from 2002 to 2004. The success of the 
NGOs in delivering education in the North indicates that the disparity in the provision of 
educational facility had more to do with the agendas of the political parties in conflict than to the 
fear of violence and lack of security (Sany, 2010). Validation of previous examination results in 
the rebel-held North and harmonization of the school calendars between the North and the South 
– later became part of the peace agreements signed by the parties in conflict.  
In addition, since the early 1990s the teacher’s struggle to regain their lost status due to 
Structural Adjustment Program became an alarming issue especially for the political parties in 
power. As Sany (2010) remarks the struggle within the education sector has also facilitated the 
escalation of the conflict from the university campus into the political sphere. During the conflict 
both sides actively sought to include university students on their side. The higher education 
institutes filled with active students’ organizations and teachers’ associations became the center 
stage of political movements. Many prominent political leaders including the former President 
Laurent Gbagbo and former Prime Minister Guillaume Soro emerged from the students’ 
movements, reinforcing the Ivoirian sentiment that the education system has produced political 
leaders rather than business leaders (Sany, 2010).  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
 
[Figure 3.1 is about here] 
 
In this study we use two main data sources. The data on local incidences of conflict is taken from 
the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED). The Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Databasei (ACLED) (Raleigh, Hegre, and Carlson, 2009) compiles exact locations, dates, 
and additional characteristics of individual battle events in states affected by civil war. The 
conflict data for Cote d’Ivoire is available for the period from 1997 to 2010. The ACLED 
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database on Cote d’Ivoire reports a total number of 965 conflict events between 1998 and 2008.  
It tracks rebel activity and distinguishes between territorial transfers of military control from 
governments to rebel groups and vice versa. The conflict events are disaggregated into six 
categories: (i) Battle - government regains territory, (ii) Battle - no change of territory, (iii) 
Battles - rebels overtake territory, (iv) Non-violent activity by a conflict actor, (v) riots/protests, 
and (vi) Violence against civilians. In Figure 3.1, we show the total number of reported conflicts 
per year for the period starting from 2001 to 2006. The conflict intensity reached its peak 
between 2002 and 2004 with a total of 459 conflict events. 
For empirical purposes, we disaggregate the conflict events into 50 departments, which 
are nested into 19 regions in Cote d’Ivoire. To decipher the causes and consequences of conflict 
at the local level, many studies have used smaller geographical regions or artificial geographic 
grid-cells (without pertaining to any meaningful sub-national border) as the unit of analysis. 
Some researchers prefer to follow the grid-cell approach because the unit of analysis does not 
change spatially (Buhaug and Rod, 2006). In comparison, when the unit of analysis is the sub-
national regions, they are likely to vary in terms of area. In this study we map the exact locations 
of the conflict event provided by the ACLED database into 50 departments using spatial 
coordinates taken from the DIVA-GISii website.  
 
[Figure 3.2 is about here] 
 
Figure 3.2 plots the total number of conflict events at the department level for the period 
2002 to 2004. On the left hand panel of Figure 3.2, we show the conflict prevalence map taken 
from the ACLED websiteiii. On the right hand panel, we plot the intensity of conflict across 
departments. The geographical areas marked with darker shades indicate departments that 
experienced more intense conflict. The incidences of civil conflict have been more frequent in 
the western and southern departments of Core d’Ivoire and in the neighborhood of Abidjan. 
Between 2001 and 2006, the average number of conflict events per department recorded at 8.6. 
In 2003, only in Abidjan the number of armed conflict events escalated to more than 150. 
Furthermore the conflict events occurred at a large number near the Line of Control administered 
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by UN and French troops.  About three-quarters (37 out of 50) of the departments experienced at 
least one conflict event during the period from 2002 to 2006.   
 
[Figure 3.3 is about here] 
 
We use the 2008 round of Households Living Standards Survey (HLSS) data, also known 
as Enquete sur le Niveau de Vie de Menage (ENV). These surveys were undertaken by the 
National Institute of Statistics in Cote D’Ivoire. The ENV-2008, jointly administered by the 
National Institute of Statistics - Cote d’Ivoire and UNICEF, was specifically designed to 
document the consequences of the civil war. A new section on the ‘impact of the war’ was added, 
which included a range of questions that are commonly used to evaluate the welfare impact of 
war on individuals and households. For example, household respondents were asked: “How did 
your income change over the years of crisis?” and “Has the current crisis affected your life?” In 
addition, the survey included a set of questions on the physical impact and casualty of the war, 
such as “Have you registered a death or illness linked to the crisis?”, “Have you been displaced 
during the war?” and “Have you suffered any violence linked to the crisis?” 
In Figure 3.3 we provide a pictorial view of the war victimization based on household 
responses. We plot the average responses at the department level; darker shades imply a higher 
average rate of victimization experience for the inhabitants in a department. It is evident that the 
civil war had an adverse effect on the livelihood of the entire population in Cote d’Ivoire; 
however the impact was more prevalent in the Middle and the Northwest of the country. Overall, 
between 30 to 50 percent of the respondents experienced declines in their income. The incidence 
of war victimization was more prominent in the departments located near the UN-peace keeping 
line and to the West where the civil war was more intense. Nearly 30 percent of the respondents 
had to hide during the war in the Northwestern departments. The conflict in the mid-West of the 
country is also marked by high levels of internal displacement. The adverse effect of the war on 
jobs and land is prevalent throughout the country. However, the people in the mid-West reported 
to have experienced loss of livestock and non-land assets.   
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Next, we turn to the education system in Cote d’Ivoire. The Certificat d’etude primaries 
elementaires (CEPE) is awarded after completing six years of primary education, which is 
followed by seven years of secondary schooling. In the final year of secondary school students 
earn a baccalaureate degree. Universities, technical and vocational trainings are part of the higher 
education system in Cote d’Ivoire (Sany, 2010). As is evident from the ENV-2008 data, in the 
sub-population consisting of individuals aged 12 and above, about 35 percent earned a CEPE 
whereas only 10 percent completed the baccalaureate degree. However, almost 40 percent from 
the same group of people did not complete the CEPE. The average years of education stands a 
little above 7 years, which is one additional year of education after six years of primary 
education (CEPE). Based on this anecdotal evidence, it could be the case that the age-cohort of 
primary school goers are likely to be one of the potential victims of war. In this study, we use 
years of education as the main outcome variable to evaluate the causal effects of war on 
education in Cote d’Ivoire.  
In Table 3.1 we provide descriptive evidence of basic indicators on conflict affected 
individuals. The first two columns compare the average outcomes for a young cohort (10 to 22 
years old) between the low conflict and the high conflict departments, the last two columns show 
the same for an older cohort (22 to 32 years old). We define high conflict as departments 
experiencing at least one conflict event in the period 2002-2006, if there is no evidence of 
reported event of conflict we call it a low conflict area. As is evident from table 3.1, the average 
years of education are lower for the young cohort, though the education attainment gap is 
insignificant between high and low conflict areas. Other educational variables do not show any 
significantly different outcomes for war affected individuals. We use log of per capita household 
consumption expenditure as an indicator of household welfare. We consider ten expenditure 
categories including food, education, health, transport, clothing, and transport among others to 
construct this indicator. The gap in the average welfare level is negligible between the high and 
the low conflict areas. While average years of education is higher for the old cohort, a higher 
percentage of households are female headed in the conflict affected areas. Among the ethnic 
groups, Akans are in large numbers in high conflict areas whereas members of the Voltaic group 
concentrate more in the low conflict areas. Overall, these preliminary summary statistics are 
suggestive of a lower educational attainment for children in the conflict affected regions, in the 
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next section we use both the direct and indirect exposure to conflict to evaluate its effect on 
educational.      
 
IV. Empirical Outcomes 
4.1. Indirect exposure to conflict: Identification using department and year of birth 
According to the ENV-2008 survey data, for more than 90 percent of the individuals who earned 
the CEPE (completed six years of primary education), it took between 6 to 10 years. This 
suggests the majority of the students in the primary school are in the 6 to 16 age group with the 
plausible assumption that primary education normally starts at the age of six. To identify the 
potential victims of war, we construct a young cohort including all primary school goers who 
were exposed to the conflict between 2002 and 2006. Based on this, the individuals aged 
between 10 and 22 years constitute the young cohort in the ENV-2008 survey. Using ENV-2008, 
we compare average years of education for individuals in the young cohort against an older 
cohort, aged between 23 and 32. The individuals in the old cohort are likely to be over the age of 
primary school goers between 2002 and 2006. We use the year of birth and the department of 
birth to identify an individual’s exposure to war. To begin with, a straight forward difference-in-
difference of average years of education is calculated based on year and department of birth.  
 
[Table 4.1.1 is about here] 
 
Table 4.1.1 reports average years of education for both age-cohorts and a war prevalence 
dummy, which takes the value of one if a department (of birth) experienced at least one conflict 
event, zero otherwise. The war prevalence of a department reflects the total number of conflict 
events between 2002 and 2006. For both age-cohorts, the average years of education in conflict-
affected departments is higher compared to the rest. However, the gap in average years of 
education is negligible for the young cohort. Two possible explanations can be offered. First, the 
war zones (departments that experienced conflict) traditionally had higher average years of 
education and this could be due to better educational facilities or better job prospects. Second, 
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due to the pernicious effect of conflict throughout the country, the gap in average years of 
education between war and non-war zones became smaller for the young age-cohort. This is 
supported by the evidence that the gap in average years of education between older and younger 
cohort is twice as big in the war zones compared to the departments with no war event.  Overall, 
the difference-in-difference outcome suggests that an individual aged between 10 and 22 
experienced an average drop of 1.2 years of education if resided in a war affected department.   
We generalize this identification strategy with a regression framework, shown as 
equation 1 (Duflo, 2001; Merrouche, 2011; Shemyakina, 2011). This estimates the average years 
of education as a function of birth fixed effects and household / individual specific controls. If 
exposure to conflict (i.e. residing in the departments that had at least one conflict event) is 
detrimental to years of schooling, then the estimated coefficient of average years of education 
will be negatively related to the intensity of war for the young age-cohort which is exposed to 
conflict.   
 
(1)    
 
where  measures years of education for an individual i born in department j in year k.  is a 
constant,  is a dummy variable indicating department of birth fixed effect,  is a 
dummy variable that measures cohort of birth fixed effect,  is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the individual belongs to the young cohort,  is a variable measuring 
intensity of conflict and  is a vector of household specific controls.   
 Table 4.1.2 presents estimates of equation (1). The first two columns show the baseline 
regression outcomes when the war intensity variable is a dummy, takes a value of one if a 
department had at least one war event, zero otherwise. The baseline regression model without 
household controls yields a coefficient of -.94. This suggests average years of education for 
individuals aged 10 to 22 is .94 years fewer compared to the individuals aged 23 to 32 in 
departments that had at least one conflict event. The coefficient drops to -.5 when we include 
12 
 
household level control variables (as shown in column 2). If there is significant variation in the 
conflict count across departments, the dummy conflict indicator may not adequately explain the 
variation in average years of education across departments. As a robustness check, the next two 
columns report the estimated coefficients of years of education when the war intensity variable is 
measured as the actual number of conflict events. The outcome suggests that an increase in the 
war intensity by one additional event of conflict lowers the average years of education for the 
young age-cohort (aged 10 to 22 years) by .01 years compared to old age-cohort (aged 23 to 32).   
 
[Table 4.1.2 is about here] 
 
For difference-in-difference to be a valid strategy, the assumption of common trends 
before the conflict periods needs to be verified. In order to check this, we compare educational 
outcomes of individuals aged 23 to 32 against individuals aged 33 to 42 years old. Presumably, 
individuals in both age cohorts were in school-going age before the conflict took place. The last 
two columns of table 4.1.2 show the estimated coefficients. The statistically insignificant 
difference-in-difference coefficient suggests that it less likely that the localization of conflict is 
endogenous with years of education and pre-existing factors such as the education has 
exacerbated the conflict. Overall, the outcomes in table 4.1.2 suggest that indirect exposure to 
conflict has a detrimental effect on years of education.  
 
 
4.2 Direct exposure to conflict: Identification using victimization indicators  
The estimated coefficients of the causal effect of war on education show an expected sign. 
However, it can be plagued by a number of issues. First, using department of birth as an 
identification strategy may not reveal the heterogeneous impact of war victimization on 
education for children from different socio-economic groups. In other words, there exists a 
possibility of selection into victimization across individuals which could be largely hidden by the 
total number of conflict events in a department. Second, the proximity to a war zone dummy 
variable may fail to identify the true impact of war on education because the intensity of war 
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measured as the count of war events varies significantly across departments. Third, due to a large 
number of internally displaced people, it is often hard to track their movements between 2004 
and 2008. It is also possible that the household control variables for the comparison group might 
have changed over time, especially if they migrate. As a result, we harbor on an alternative 
identification strategy to measure the direct exposure to conflict.  
As a next step, we use 11 victimization indicators as potential identifiers of true war 
victims. The victimization indicators are dummy variables, which takes the value of one for a 
household or individual being a victim, zero otherwise. It is possible that the self-reported 
victimization indicators may produce subjective bias related to a particular ethnic group or other 
identities. The simplest way to detect the extent of this bias is to estimate each victimization 
indicator as a function of the observable characteristics. The estimated outcome does not 
conform to any subjective bias generated by any particular variable (for reasons of space we do 
not show the outcome in the paper; it is available from the authors if requested).   
We first estimate the standard linear OLS regression outcomes of years of education as a 
function of the victimization dummy and household and individual controls on a sample 
restricted to individuals aged between 10 and 22 (who are likely to be in the primary school 
during the conflict). In Table 4.2.1 we report the estimated coefficients for the eleven 
victimization categories (columns M1 through M11). The coefficients of all the victimization 
dummy variables are negative. The coefficients are statistically significant for victimized 
individuals or households when they registered deaths or injuries due to conflict , income 
dropped, lost job, lost livestock and experienced violence due to war. Overall, the estimated war 
outcomes on education are in line with previous findings, despite the fact that the impact of war 
is now identified by a set of victimization indicators based on the subjective evaluation of war 
impact by the survey respondents.   
 
 
[Table 4.2.1 is about here] 
 
 
V.  Sensitivity analysis 
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5.1. Propensity score matching outcomes 
The identification strategies used so far assume that the war victims (as identified above) and 
control groups are exchangeable, such that they have identical distributions of variables. This can 
be confirmed by data using a randomized controlled trial; however, drawing causal inference 
using survey data requires a more careful analysis because selection biases and confounding 
invalidates the exchangeability assumption. In such cases the estimated causal effects are likely 
to be biased. Since a direct comparison of two groups of individuals may not overcome the 
problem of identification, we go one step further and employ propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This means pairing individuals who are identical based on all 
observable characteristics (including department of birth, other households characteristics and 
the relevant socio-economic factors) that the rich ENV-2008 survey data offers, except variables 
that measure war victimization. We discuss it more formally in the online appendix.  
There exists a range of possibilities for matching algorithms; however, the performance 
of different matching estimators depends largely on the data structure (Zhao, 2000). For our 
purpose, we use the straightforward nearest neighbor matching as a baseline strategy. This 
method first categorized both the treatment and the control group records according to the 
estimated propensity score and then searches backward and forward for the closest control units 
for a particular treatment value. Overall, most of our empirical models do not encounter any 
common support problem (discussed in detail in the online appendix). Table 5.1 summarizes the 
estimated effect of war on educational outcomes for each of the 11 models. The propensity score 
matching method yields a negative impact of conflict on years of education in the sample restricted to 
individuals aged between 10 and 22. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) indicates 
that irrespective of the type of war victimization, war victims in comparison with the matched 
control group indicate a lower average years of education. The mean difference is significant 
particularly when the war victims registered for deaths due to the war, their income dropped, 
they lost jobs and they reported being affected by the war. 
 
[Table 5.1 is about here] 
15 
 
 
As a further robustness check we use the concept of double-robust estimators (Robins, 
2000; Bang and Robins, 2005). The double-robust estimation method requires a model for 
estimating the propensity scores and the outcome model (OLS in our case) in the same estimator 
(discussed in detail in the online appendix). Overall, the findings show mixed outcomes, and 
there exists a trade-off in the estimation model choice between the OLS and propensity scores 
matching. We also employ additional matching criteria such as the nearest neighbor matching 
without replacement, the caliper matching, and the kernel matching. The findings (shown in the 
online appendix) reveal that the causal effect of war on education is negative throughout and this 
outcome is independent of any matching criterion.  
 
5.2. Alternative measures of educational outcomes 
 
In the previous analysis we used only total years of education as an educational outcome variable. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we propose to look at another potential outcome variable that measures 
the percentage of population that completed CEPE (six years of primary education). This is 
justified by the fact that the average years of education based on the ENV-2008 data is recorded 
as being little over 7 years and almost 40 percent of the population fail to complete the CEPE. 
Thus, percent completed CEPE can be a good indicator the status of education in Cote d’Ivoire. 
We estimate nonparametric kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions of percent ever 
completing six years of primary education against age using Epanechnikov kernel. We ran the 
regressions separately for the war victims and the rest of the sample as identified by the 
victimization indicators. The internally displaced individuals do not show a different trend in the 
successful completion of CEPE; however, from households that suffered from ownership loss, 
indicate a drop in the rate of successful completion of six years of primary education.   
  
 
5.3. Effect of direct exposure to war on sub-samples: The North versus the South 
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We compare empirical outcomes from sub-samples: the North and the South. We designate the 
departments using the United Nations peace-keeping line (also known as the fault line). Out of a 
total of 50 departments, the North has 16 and the rest of the departments are classified as being 
in the South. We find that for both the old and the young cohort, the average years of education 
is lower in the North (The tables are shown in online appendix III). The difference-in-difference 
outcome implies individuals in the young-age cohort have on average .72 more years of 
education compared to the old cohort in the North. This is somewhat in contradiction with the 
anecdotal evidence that the North was hit harder due to conflict. To obtain a generalized picture, 
we run OLS regression outcomes. The impact of conflict on the average years of education by 
regions (the North and the South) is identified by the victimization indicators with the same set 
of control variables. Overall, the findings do not suggest any clear evidence in support of the 
North being the worst war-affected region in terms of education outcomes.    
 
5.4. Effect of direct exposure to war on sub-samples: Gender and age-specific groups  
Table 5.4 reports outcomes of direct exposure to conflict on years of education for females, males and 
other subgroups comprising of individuals aged 10 to 14, 15 to 18, 19 to 22 years old. On average, male 
respondents who are direct victims of conflict have less number of years of education. Female 
respondents report negative outcomes however the magnitude of the effect of conflict is lower and less 
significant statistically. When compared across different age groups, for individuals in the age group 19-
22 who are directly exposed to conflict show a larger drop in years of education, in some cases about 2 
years. Individuals in this age group, whose family members experienced a job loss or a drop in income 
due to conflict experienced the largest drop in years of education. This could be because they joined the 
labor force to help support their families. Overall, direct exposure to conflict affects years of education 
negatively, the outcomes are robust.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The relationship between education and war in Cote d’Ivoire is complex. While anecdotal 
evidence from various reports and studies suggest that education has been a clear victim of war, 
the education system in the North has been a victim of Ivoirian politics since the early 1990s and 
the North-South divide following the civil war only exacerbated that ongoing crisis. This makes 
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the task of finding a causal inference of the war on education particularly challenging. In this 
paper we estimate the causal effect of civil war on years of education for individuals who were 
exposed to conflict between 2002 and 2006 in their school-going age. We use the Households 
Living Standards Survey (HLSS) data collected in 2008 (ENV-2008) and the data on local 
incidences of conflict is taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) 
for the empirical analysis.  
We employed empirical strategies to identify both direct and indirect exposure to conflict 
for individuals in their school going age.  We use the year of birth and the department of birth to 
determine an individual’s indirect exposure to war. The difference-in-difference outcomes 
indicate that the average years of education for individuals aged 10 to 22 is .94 years fewer 
compared to the individuals aged 23 to 32 in war-affected regions. The validity of the finding is 
tested by a number of factors such as common support before the break-out of conflict, 
heterogeneous selection into victimization both across and within a region and varying intensity 
of conflict across regions. The direct impacts include destruction of infrastructure, displacement 
and most tragically deaths of students and teachers, problems in harmonization of school 
calendars across the war-affected regions and closure of schools for an indefinite period. Other 
effects such as loss of jobs and farm, decrease in income and experiencing violence could also 
affect the education of children in the same household. To realize the full potential impact of war, 
we used a set of victimization indicators to identify the direct impact of the war. The fixed effect 
OLS models conform to the negative impact of conflict on education outcomes.   
 We use a number of tests to check the validity of the estimated outcomes. We used 
propensity scores matching to minimize the selection bias and confounding in the causal effect. 
The average effect of war as identified by the victimization categories reports a .2 to .9 fewer 
average years of education for the war victims in comparison to the matched control group. The 
moderately satisfactory outcomes of double-robust models lower chances of misspecification in 
the estimated models. The outcomes are also robust when we use alternative matching methods, 
using different educational outcome variables and estimating the North and the South 
subsamples separately. We also looked at subsamples by gender and different age-groups. For 
individuals in the age group 19-22, the estimated outcomes show the largest impact of conflict on 
18 
 
years of education; males on average have less years of education compared to females when 
directly exposed to conflict.   
Understanding the mechanism though which war affects education is critical in order to 
disentangle the causal effects of war on education. The education and war nexus in Cote d’Ivoire 
provides a complex picture and in this paper we attempted to explore the channels through which 
war could possibly affect education. Nevertheless, some caveats apply. The role of third parties, 
such as NGOs in promoting primary and secondary education in the North is difficult to measure 
in the estimated causal effect. It is also possible that the existence of internally displaced 
populations and the timing of the survey could downplay the estimated causal effect. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence derived from our study on Cote d’Ivoire provides robust 
support to the existing studies on how war has a detrimental impact on education.  
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Figure 3.1 Incidence of Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: 2001 to 2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ACLED database 
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Figure 3.2 Conflict events map at the department level: 2001 to 2006 
Conflict events map from ACLED 
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Figure 3.3 A pictorial description of war victimization 
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Source: ACLED and authors’ own calculations based on the 2008 round of Enquete sur le Niveau de Vie de Menage 
(ENV). 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive evidence 
  
Young cohort  
(Age 10 to 22) 
Old cohort  
(Age 23 to 32) 
  
Low 
conflict 
High 
conflict 
Low 
conflict 
High 
conflict 
Average years of education 6.30 6.46 7.75 9.17 
Completed primary education 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.28 
Registered in school 0.73 0.72 0.09 0.12 
Log of per capita consumption expenditure 11.34 11.53 11.55 11.83 
Female 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.43 
Household head is female 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.19 
Number of children below 5 years old 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.76 
Number of children 5 to 9 years old 1.00 0.94 0.68 0.63 
Number of children 10 to 14 years old 1.15 1.15 0.46 0.47 
Average years of education ( excluding children) 4.08 4.41 4.72 5.83 
Ethnic group: Akan 0.25 0.36 0.26 0.37 
Ethnic group: Krou 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.17 
Ethnic group: Mande North 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.13 
Ethnic group: Mande South 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Ethnic group: Voltaic 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.10 
Religion: Muslim 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.31 
Religion: Christian 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.52 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the 2008 round of Enquete sur le Niveau de Vie de Menage (ENV). 
High conflict areas include departments that experienced at least one event of conflict during the period from 2002 
and 2006. Low conflict areas include department that did not experience any events related to conflict in the same 
period.  
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Table 4.1.1 Means of Years of Education by Cohort and War Prevalence 
  Years of education 
  No War  War Difference 
Old Cohort (Aged 23 to 32 in 2008)  
7.84 9.18 -1.34 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.18) 
Young cohort (Aged 10 to 22 in 2008) 
6.32 6.46 -0.14 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
Difference 
1.52 2.71 -1.20 
(0.13) (0.08) (0.16) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis, all estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1 percent 
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Table 4.1.2 Effect of War on Education using 2008 household survey data 
(Dependent variable = Years of Education) 
  
War intensity = dummy 
(=1 if there was at least 
one war event) 
War intensity = actual 
number of conflict 
events 
War intensity = 
dummy (=1 if 
there was at least 
one war event) 
War intensity = 
actual number 
of conflict 
events 
War intensity ×  
Cohort dummy (ages 10 to 22 = 
1; ages 23 to 32 = 0) 
-0.940*** -0.499*** -0.011*** -0.008*** 
  War intensity ×  
Cohort dummy (ages 23-32 = 1; 
ages 33 to 42 = 0) 
    
    
-0.123 -0.001 
Control variables 
  
  
  
Birth fixed effects (department) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth fixed effects (Age Cohort) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls No Yes No  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 8.355*** 4.677*** 8.477*** 4.651*** 1.135 1.173 
Observations 16,345 16,017 16,345 16,017 8,161 8,161 
R squared 0.235 0.423 0.241 0.426 0.342 0.342 
Notes: The household level controls include log per capita consumption expenditure, gender, gender of household 
head, average years of education in the household, ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South, Voltaic 
(comparison group) and religious groups (Muslims and Christians); *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies 
significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%. Estimation with robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.2.1 OLS Regression outcomes on Average Years of Education for individuals aged 10 to 22 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 
Registered 
deaths  
-0.128** 
          
Registered 
injury  
-0.115* 
         
Displaced 
  
-0.033 
        
Income 
dropped    
-0.220*** 
       
Lost 
ownership     
-0.125 
      
Lost job 
     
-1.602*** 
     
Lost farm 
      
-0.516 
    
Lost 
livestock        
-0.682*** 
   
Lost assets 
        
-0.200 
  
Affected by 
the war          
-0.058 
 
Experienced 
violence           
-0.240*** 
Control 
variables 
                      
Birth fixed 
effects 
(department) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth fixed 
effects (Age 
Cohort) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.152*** 6.076*** 6.185*** 6.213*** 6.181*** 6.115*** 6.192*** 6.168*** 6.190*** 6.235*** 6.172*** 
Observations 10,552 10,331 10,492 10,625 10,625 10,625 10,625 10,625 10,625 10,625 10,625 
R squared 0.455 0.457 0.456 0.457 0.456 0.457 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456 
Notes: The household level controls include log per capita consumption expenditure, gender, gender of household 
head, average years of education in the household, ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South, Voltaic 
(comparison group) and religious groups (Muslims and Christians); *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies 
significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%. Estimation with robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 Estimated effects of war on years of education using propensity score matching 
(Matching method: nearest neighbor) 
Model Observations Treatment Controls ATT 
M1 Registered deaths  10496 6.368 6.561 -0.193* 
M2 Registered injury 10249 6.490 6.590 -0.100 
M3 Displaced 10888 6.425 6.564 -0.139 
M4 Income dropped 10625 6.409 6.686 -0.277** 
M5 Lost ownership 10070 6.217 6.530 -0.313 
M6 Lost job 6541 5.182 6.364 -1.182* 
M7 Lost farm 4870 5.392 5.804 -0.412 
M8 Lost livestock 5335 5.589 5.900 -0.311 
M9 Lost assets 7305 6.811 7.232 -0.421 
M10 Affected by the war 10625 6.535 6.761 -0.226** 
M11 Experienced violence 10167 6.468 6.625 -0.158 
*** implies significant at 1%, ** implies significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%. 
 (ATT: the average treatment effect on the treated)  
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Table 5.4 OLS Regression outcomes on Average Years of Education for individuals by gender and age 
groups 
  All Girls Boys 
Aged 
10-14 
Aged 
15-18 
Aged 
19-22 
Registered deaths  -0.128** -0.012 -0.232*** -0.103 -0.040 -0.212 
Registered injury -0.115* -0.044 -0.172** -0.155** -0.044 -0.053 
Displaced -0.033 -0.044 -0.031 -0.085 -0.138 0.203 
Income dropped -0.220*** -0.170* -0.248*** 0.039 -0.100 -0.504*** 
Lost ownership -0.125 -0.034 -0.161 -0.202 0.111 -0.225 
Lost job -1.602*** -1.347*** -1.766*** -0.672* -1.491** -2.056*** 
Lost farm -0.516 -0.750** -0.439 -0.192 -0.479 -0.582 
Lost livestock -0.682*** -0.441 -0.831** 0.036 -0.594 -1.039* 
Lost assets -0.200 -0.488 0.034 -0.027 0.012 -0.419 
Affected by the war -0.058 0.030 -0.134** -0.007 -0.003 -0.160 
Experienced violence -0.240*** -0.081 -0.357*** -0.008 -0.155 -0.409* 
Notes: The household level controls include log per capita consumption expenditure, gender of household head, 
average years of education in the household, ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South, Voltaic 
(comparison group) and religious groups (Muslims and Christians); *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies 
significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%. Estimation with robust standard errors. 
 
 
                                                            
iFor more information go to the ACLED website at  http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Armed-
Conflict-Location-and-Event-Data/ 
iiDIVA-GIS website for Cote d’Ivoire http://www.diva-gis.org/datadown 
iiiThe following website http://www.acleddata.com/index.php/dynamic-maps provides conflict maps for a number 
of countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
